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THE POWER OF A TRANSFEREE JUDGE TO
TRANSFER LIABILITY AND DAMAGES TRIAL
JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI*
A DISTURBING trend has been developing in multidistrict
litigation cases by which a transferee judge is permitted to
transfer cases to himself for trial on the issues of liability and dam-
age. The Second Circuit has recently spoken on this procedure in
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord' wherein the transfer was permitted. It is be-
lieved that the cases creating this trend ignore not only the clear
mandate of section 1407 of Title 28,' but also the intent and pur-
pose of Congress in enacting the multidistrict litigation statute.
One can hardly quarrel with the basic principles that underlie the
multidistrict litigation statute, nor with its intended purpose. For
example, in the field of anti-trust, it is not uncommon for dozens of
cases to be brought alleging identical causes of action. It would be
utter chaos to have simultaneous pretrial proceedings in each case.
Different considerations apply to transfer, however, often accom-
panied by consolidation of cases for trial after the completion of
* B.A., Mississippi College; J.D., University of Virginia; Attorney at Law,
Los Angeles, California.
1447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Multiple civil treble damage ac-
tions alleging a conspiracy to fix prices and exclude competitors were brought
against five antibiotic drug manufacturers after they had initially been convicted
in a criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act, which has subsequently been
reversed and remanded. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd for new trial, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970) opinion modified
and rehearing denied, 437 F.2d 957, afT'd, 92 S. Ct. 731 (1972). The Judicial Panel
transferred over 150 of these cases, including many class action claims, to the
Southern District of New York. After a settlement offer by the defendants, many
of the cases were settled, including various class action claims brought on behalf
of the consuming public, state and county hospitals, private hospitals and retail
and wholesale groups. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), afl'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971). The cases whose transfer was before the Second Circuit represented most,
but not all, of the remaining non-settling actions.
228 U.S.C. 5 1407 (1970).
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pretrial proceedings. These considerations argue against the emerg-
ing rationale that permits a transferee court to transfer to itself
multidistrict litigation cases for purposes other than pretrial pro-
ceedings.
I. THE BASIC PREMISES INVOLVED
Two basic premises underlie the decisions permitting the trans-
feree court to try liability and damages. First is the assumed power
of the transferee court to decide the propriety of transfer of a case
under section 1404 (a).' The rationale of permitting the transferee
judge to decide whether the multidistrict cases should be transferred
to himself for trial is mainly predicated upon the language of section
296.' Particular reliance is placed upon the provision that states
that a judge to whom the multidistrict cases have been assigned by
the Judicial Panel has "all the powers of a judge of the court, circuit
or district to which he is designated and assigned. . .. "' According-
ly, so the reasoning goes, a transferee judge has the power to trans-
fer cases under section 1404(a) the same as any other judge. Little
difficulty is found with the provision of section 1407(a) which
states:
Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or
before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated ......
What appears to be the clear mandate of the statute is avoided by
the courts on the grounds that section 1407 deals only with the
powers of the multidistrict litigation panel, and not with the powers
of the judge to whom the cases have been assigned by the Panel.!
To hold otherwise, said the Second Circuit in Pfizer, "would mean
that all proceedings on any section 1404(a) motion would have to
be suspended for the entire period of pretrial, the cases remanded
to a number of different districts, and then each district judge con-
sider separate 1404(a) motions."' The Pfizer court ignored, how-
'28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
-28 U.S.C. § 296 (1970).
1 Id.
'28 U.S.C. 1407(a) (1970).
7 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1971).
'Id. at 125.
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ever, the notion that a section 1404(a) motion can be heard either
before or at the conclusion of the pretrial proceedings. There is no
requirement that the motion must be made during the pretrial pro-
ceedings. Moreover, none of the interests of the parties would be
adversely effected by having the motion for transfer determined by
the transferor court after remand, as provided by section 1407. The
transferor court would be better equipped to make an appropriate
determination as it could focus on the interests of the immediate
parties before it and could evaluate more readily those circum-
stances favoring local and separate trial as against transfer and
consolidation.
The second premise permitting the transferee judge to transfer
the cases to himself, even on his own motion, rests upon postulated
interests of judicial efficiency irrespective of whether the factors
explicitly set forth in section 1404(a) have otherwise been satis-
fied. The factors that the courts have given predominent weight are
the experience and convenience of the transferee judge. This is
"because of the complexity of these cases the interests of judicial
efficiency make it highly desirable that the judge who conducted
the pretrial proceedings continue as the trial judge. . . ," In other
words, since the judge gained knowledge about the applicable issues
and facts, he should try the case. But that factor is unpersuasive
since any judge who conducts coordinated pretrial proceedings
gains this knowledge of the case.
In Pfizer, none of the thirty-one cases transferred to Minnesota
for trial originated in that state or had any apparent connection
with the District Court of Minnesota, a forum chosen for the con-
venience of the transferee judge. None of the parties,'" plaintiff or
defendant, came from Minnesota. None of the principal counsel in
any of the cases sought to be transferred were from the District of
Minnesota. None of the witnesses who might be called to testify
were from Minnseota. Moreover, the document repository estab-
lished by court order, containing hundreds of thousands of docu-
ments, was located in New York City. Finally, none of the prior
proceedings had been held in Minnesota.
What was demonstrated in this antibiotic drug litigation was
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he should try the cases.'1 Since it was inconvenient for him to try
them in the Southern District of New York where they had been
assigned for coordinated pretrial proceedings, he transferred them
to his home district via section 1404(a)." It is submitted that sec-
tion 1404(a) was never intended for this purpose; if the conveni-
ence of the transferee judge is the key factor in determining whether
an action or group of actions should be transferred under section
1404(a), then every case that has been transferred by the Panel
under section 1407 will end up being tried by the transferee judge.
Moreover, if a section 1404 (a) transfer turns on the convenience
of the transferee judge, then this ignores the obvious purpose of
section 1404(a), which is to permit transfer of an action from a
technically proper venue that may be entirely inconvenient for one
of the parties. Professor Moore points out that the most important
factors bearing on whether transfer should be ordered are (i) plain-
tiffs' initial choice of forum; (ii) the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; and (iii) the availability of compulsory process
and the location of witnesses." Indeed, in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert,"'
the Supreme Court explicitly accepted these factors.
In the multidistrict cases, these factors have been set aside by
judicial fiat. At the present stage of interpretation the important
and controlling factor is whether the transferee judge who conducts
the pretrial proceedings wants to try the cases. If so, then all he has
to do is transfer the cases to himself for trial on his own motion,
irrespective of the desires of the litigants."3 If this is true, then sec-
tion 1407, which explicitly states that the action transferred "shall
be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pre-
trial proceedings,"'" is meaningless.
II. THE FALLACIES OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Apart from the premises underlying the decisions allowing the
transferee court to try liability and damages is the more basic ques-
11 Id.
12Id.
"a 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.145 [5], at 1780 (2d ed. 1971).
14330 U.S. 501 (1947).
"1 Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM
L. REV. 41, 63 (1971).
"6 See note 17 infra.
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tion of whether the transferee judge has the power to transfer the
cases to another district for purposes of trial. The pertinent deci-
sions concede that the multidistrict panel has no power to transfer
the case because of the mandatory language of section 1407. Al-
though the transferee judge derives his authority solely from sec-
tion 1407, nevertheless, according to these authorities, he does
have authority to transfer the cases because he "has all of the pow-
ers of a judge of the court . . . to which he is designated or as-
signed." One of the powers of any judge is to hear section 1404(a)
motions. Except in the unique circumstances of transferred cases,
the section 1404(a) motion involves the transfer of the case from
the hearing judge to a judge in another district, not to himself. In
this author's opinion, this reasoning is bottomed upon a fallacious
premise-that the general language of section 296, dealing with
the assignment and designation of judges, controls over the very
explicit language of section 1407.
The district court's jurisdiction over the cases in the first instance
is derived solely from section 1407, resulting from transfer of the
cases to himself by the multidistrict panel acting under that section.
Section 1407 specifically requires the Panel to remand an action to
its transferor court, unless the case has been terminated.' There
are no other statutory options. The Panel cannot transfer cases
to any district other than the transferor court nor can it leave co-
ordinated cases in the transferee district for trial purposes.
This statutory mandate was chosen by Congress after an ex-
tensive review of the alternatives. The legislative history is replete
with statements emphasizing the non-transferability of multidistrict
litigation by the transferee court.
Illustrative is the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
which states:
Paragraph (a) also requires transferred cases to be remanded to
the originating district at the close of the coordinated pretrial pro-
ceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in
the consolidated proceedings. The experience of the Coordinating
Committee was limited to pretrial matters, and your committee
consequently considers it desirable to keep this legislative proposal
17 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). Section 1407 provides in pertinent part: "Each
action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial to the district which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated ....
19721
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within the confines of that experience. Additionally, trial in the
originating district is generally preferable from the standpoint of
the parties and witnesses, and from the standpoint of the courts,
it would be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried
in one district. Finally, the committee recognizes that in most cases
there will be a need for local discovery proceedings to supplement
coordinated discovery proceedings, and that consequently remand
to the originating district for this purpose will be desirable. Of
course, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, providing for changes of venue generally,
is available for those instances where transfer of a case for all pur-
poses is desirable."9
By withholding the authority to consolidate multidistrict cases
for trial from the transferee court, Congress recognized the legiti-
mate and substantial interest in the local determination of transfer
motions, which should be made on case-by-case basis. As the Re-
port of the Senate Judiciary Committee indicates, factors such as
the necessity of local discovery, the availability of witnesses and
compulsory process, the status of local calendars and the desire to
avoid massive over-centralization of litigation in one court, were all
factors entering into the congressional decision.19
Thus, it is quite clear that the legislation, which was based on
the experience of the Coordinating Committee in the Electrical
Equipment Cases, was not intended to consolidate cases for trial.
The courts had had no experience with the massive trials, did not
contemplate the trials and would be unable to cope with them.
Indeed, Chief Judge William Becker, a member of the Coordi-
nating Committee in the Electrical Equipment Cases, made this
quite clear in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
He told the Committee that one of the reasons transfer for pretrial
purposes only was desirable was ". . . the inability of one or a few
transferee districts to try fully hundreds of thousands of claims for
relief as distinguished from ability to conduct pretrial of hundreds
of thousands of claims involving one or more common questions of
fact, not local in scope.
'0
Moreover, the legislative history further demonstrates that trans-
fers under section 1404(a), even if desirable, could be made prior
"S. REP. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1967).
"Id.
"Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 17
(1966).
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to the commencement or after the conclusion of the pretrial pro-
ceedings. The comments of the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
district Litigation of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
which were read into the record, are quite pertinent.
The statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation.
It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude transfer
under other statutes (e.g., Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406-
(b)) prior to or at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings .... The
major inovation proposed is transfer solely for pretrial purposes.
The statute's objectives of eliminating conflict and duplication and
of assuring efficient and economical pretrial proceedings would
thus be achieved without losing the benefits of local trials in the
appropriate districts."
It should be added that this author is not unmindful that rule
15(e) of the Panel's Rules of Procedure seems to give the trans-
feree judge the power to consider transfer of a particular case. That
rule states that actions will be remanded to the district from which
they were transferred "unless ordered transferred by the transferee
judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 22
But this rule cannot increase the power of the transferee court
contrary to the mandatory letter and spirit of section 1407 (a). The
112'Panel's rules cannot be "inconsistent with Acts of Congress...
and, therefore, any rule that expands the authority given to it by
Congress is of no effect.
III. CONCLUSION
Should the clear mandate of Congress in enacting section 1407,
as reflected by the legislative history, be ignored under the label of
"judicial efficiency" to fit the convenience of the transferee judge's
conducting the pretrial proceedings.
What about the expenses to the litigants of trying the case in a
strange jurisdiction, the availability of witnesses who must be trans-
ported from other areas and the necessity of employing local coun-
sel? Are not these factors the most important? Why should the con-
21 H.R. 8276, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 21, 24 (1966) (emphasis added).
"2 Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation, Rule
15(e), 1 C.C.H. Av. L. REP. § 3870 (1971).
2328 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1970).
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venience of the judge who wants to try the case be a consideration
at all?
Rights of litigants should not be cast aside to satisfy some nebu-
lous concept of judicial efficiency, absent some controlling reason
and statutory authority.
It is time for the reviewing courts to put some brakes upon the
usurpation of power by the district courts contrary to a direct statu-
tory command. In view of the attack upon our judicial institutions
from many fronts, the courts must be increasingly alert to abuses
creeping into the judicial system. Disregard of congressional man-
dates is an abuse that should not be countenanced.
